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We claim that religious orthodoxy is related to prejudice toward groups that violate
important values, i.e., atheists. Moreover, we suggest that expressing prejudice may
efficiently reduce the threat posed by this particular group among people who hold
high levels, but not low levels, of orthodox belief. We tested these assumptions in
an experimental study in which, after being exposed to atheistic worldviews (value-
threat manipulation), high and low orthodox participants were allowed (experimental
condition) or not (control condition) to express prejudice toward atheists. Threat was
operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index,
the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low) levels of
orthodox belief responded with increased HR after the threat manipulation. However, we
observed decreased HR after the expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly
orthodox participants compared to the control condition. We did not find this effect
among people holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, we conclude that expressing
prejudice toward this particular group may be an efficient strategy to cope with the
threat posed by this group for highly orthodox people. The results are discussed in light
of previous findings on religious beliefs and the self-regulatory function of prejudice.
Keywords: religious orthodoxy, threat from value-violating groups, cardiovascular reactivity, prejudice
INTRODUCTION
Large-scale uncertainties, i.e., economic crises, immigration crises, unemployment, cultural change
or terrorism, often spill over to focus attention on life, death, and existence, thus frequently
fuel religion (e.g., Herriot, 2007). Indeed, researchers assert that religion helps its followers to
understand and predict their environment, thus buffering them from the uncertainty associated
with disruptions to order and meaning (Heine et al., 2006; Hogg et al., 2010; Inzlicht et al.,
2011). This is possible because religious ideas tend to be highly stable, and indeed often evoke
eternity. They explain the world as having a purpose, and they prescribe various kinds of values,
moral or otherwise. The more simplistic, black–white, or dogmatic these beliefs are, the more
order, predictability and certainty they provide (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Brandt and
Reyna, 2010). Thus, religious orthodoxy, characterized by a rigid, closed-minded, and dogmatic
interpretation of religious contents (e.g., Wulff, 1991), may offer relief from uncertainty, by
providing a sense of predictability and control (Inzlicht et al., 2009; Inzlicht and Tullett, 2010;
Kossowska et al., 2016b; Sekerdej et al., in press).
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Nevertheless, this process is not cost-free, as the simplified
picture of the world that results is frequently distorted and
has important behavioral consequences (e.g., Devine and Sharp,
2009; Smith et al., 2015). For example, one can easily imagine
how the belief that one possesses the absolute truth can smoothly
develop into negative attitudes toward those who do not accept
it, let alone toward those who openly disagree with it. Indeed,
many studies have demonstrated that religion is associated with
more rather than less prejudice (e.g., Jackson and Hunsberger,
1999; Rowatt et al., 2005; Kossowska and Sekerdej, 2015; Sekerdej
et al., in press). Recently, however, evidence has been found to
suggest that religious people are selectively prejudiced (Batson
et al., 1993; Rowatt et al., 2009), meaning that religious beliefs
can encourage prejudice toward certain groups like homosexuals,
single mothers, or atheists, but discourage prejudice toward other
groups like the poor or older people (Kossowska and Sekerdej,
2015).
In the present study, we claim that religious orthodoxy is
linked to prejudice, i.e., negative attitudes (Crandall et al., 2002),
toward groups that in any way challenge religious worldviews or
value systems. Atheists constitute the group that is supposedly
the most threatening for orthodox believers. This is because
atheists and religious people compete for the promotion of
their own important moral values and belief systems (Jackson
and Hunsberger, 1999). Religious people also tend to view
atheists as distrustful, dissimilar, and to be violators of important
norms and valued traditions (Beit-Hallahmi, 2010; Gervais,
2011; Gervais et al., 2011). The dissimilarity between these
two groups itself may also cause threat, according to the idea
that people seek to affirm the validity of their own values. In
other words, in the face of groups perceived to be dissimilar to
themselves, the sense of threat is awakened (e.g., Skitka et al.,
2005; Brandt et al., 2014; Brandt and Van Tongeren, 2016;
Sekerdej et al., in press).
Any kind of threat, such as that posed by value-violators, is an
uncomfortable and aversive state, therefore, people generally feel
the need to eliminate it (for an overview see Jonas et al., 2014).
We claim that expressing prejudice may serve as an efficient
strategy to reduce the threat posed by value-violators. This
reasoning is consistent with research suggesting that prejudice
and discrimination directed toward members of groups that
violate important values, norms and traditions can be used to
bolster one’s cultural worldview, and thus reduce threat (for an
overview, see Burke et al., 2010). There is a body of research
showing that threat increases group identification, adherence to
group values, including religious ones (Hogg et al., 2010), and
the propensity to defend them (McGregor et al., 2001; Hogg
et al., 2007; for reviews see Kesebir and Pyszczynski, 2011; Jonas
et al., 2014). In a similar vein, there is also experimental evidence
showing that threat increases religious zeal (Hogg et al., 2010,
for a review) that in turn can increase prejudice against those
who do not share similar values. Our claim is also in line with
studies showing that expressing prejudice against members of
another group can buffer one’s self-esteem against self-threats
(e.g., Fein and Spencer, 1997; Hogg, 2001; Collange et al., 2009).
Thus, orthodox beliefs can lead people to reject or discriminate
against those who might distort the neat and ordered picture of
the world those beliefs provide; to push back against those who
are thus perceived as violating important religious values.
Although a considerable amount of research has indeed
demonstrated that the threat posed by value-violators leads to
negative attitudes toward these groups (e.g., Hunsberger and
Jackson, 2005; Brandt and Van Tongeren, 2016; Kossowska et al.,
2016a; Sekerdej et al., in press), the hypothesis that expressing
prejudice reduces threat has never been directly tested. Thus,
we decided to test this hypothesis directly using cardiovascular
reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR), as a psychophysiological index of
threat (Brehm et al., 1964; Croyle and Cooper, 1983; Elkin and
Leippe, 1986; Losch and Cacioppo, 1990; Harmon-Jones et al.,
1996; Robinson and Demaree, 2007; Butler et al., 2009). HR is
a robust and “pure” measure of sympathetic and parasympathetic
activity collected over short time intervals (Berntson et al.,
1994; Cacioppo et al., 1994). Studies of stressor-induced HR
reactivity have estimated its high internal consistency and test–
retest reliability (Cacioppo, 1994; Uchino et al., 1995). Finally,
HR plays a critical role in the regulation of both behavioral
and physiological responses, including the regulation of “fear
responses” (Milad et al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2008; Schiller et al.,
2008). Increase in HR is also robustly elicited by social threat
(Wager et al., 2009), something that makes it a useful measure for
capturing perceptions of threat posed by value-violating groups.
Thus, we expect that people holding high (vs. low) levels
of orthodox belief may respond with increased HR after
being exposed to worldviews that challenge their value system.
Moreover, we assume that highly orthodox participants will
respond with decreased HR after having expressed prejudice
toward the same outgroup, compared to those who will not have
been given this opportunity. That is because expressing prejudice
toward this particular group is a self-regulatory mechanism that
helps highly orthodox people to reduce the feelings of threat
posed by value-violating groups.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Before the experiment, a group of 581 volunteers (423
women, Mage = 28.51, SD = 82.17) were asked via an
online questionnaire whether they believe in God (1 – yes,
2 – no) and if yes, they were asked to indicate their
religious affiliation (Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy,
Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, or other). Participants
were recruited by an announcement via a local online social
portal. They were also asked to complete the Right-Wing
Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1996; ratings were obtained
on a 5-point scale, from 1 [completely disagree] to 5 [completely
agree]; α = 0.68 M = 2.02; SD = 0.56) just to make the online
study more believable for participants. We did not use the results
of this scale or further analysis, as RWA was not of our interests.
Three hundred and forty-two people (270 women,
Mage = 23.87, SD = 6.49) declared themselves to be believers,
and from this group 266 (211 women, Mage = 24.19, SD= 12.35)
described themselves as Catholics. This group was asked to
complete the Post-Critical Belief scale (Duriez et al., 2000;
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33 items). Ratings were obtained on a 7-point scale, from 1
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Based on their
answers we calculated an orthodoxy index (α = 0.88, M = 3.21,
SD= 1.43). Sample items of the orthodoxy scale are “I think that
Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written,” “God
has been defined once and for all and is therefore immutable”
and “Only the major religious traditions guarantee admittance
to God.” This subscale was roughly normally distributed and
was used to create two groups with higher (>90th percentile,
M = 4.57; SD = 0.94) and lower (<10th percentile, M = 2.13;
SD = 0.53) orthodoxy levels. The rationale for using groups
extremely low and high in orthodoxy was the specificity of
psychophysiological studies. Due to the fact that this type of
study is difficult to run, it is a common practice to use small
sample sizes. On the other hand, there is a risk that with small
sample size the study would be underpowered. Therefore, we
decided to increase the statistical power of the study by using a
pre-selected sample of participants who were very high and very
low in the crucial variable as suggested by Preacher et al. (2005).
After screening, 38 participants were invited to the experiment
(29 women, Mage = 24.32, SD = 7.02; in the highly orthodox
group N = 17, 12 women, Mage = 23.94, SD = 6.18; in the low
orthodox group N = 21, 17 women, Mage = 24.62, SD= 7.76).
An a priori power analysis (G∗Power 3.1.9.2, Faul et al., 2009)
for large effect size of f = 0.50, revealed that a sample of 34
participants should be needed to reach statistical power at the
recommended 0.80 level (Cohen, 1988) for the interaction effect.
Thus, our sample size (N = 38) was sufficient to run all reported
analyses. We assumed very large effect due to the non-probability
sampling (only participants extreme in orthodoxy were invited
for the study). This approach is commonly used to achieve greater
statistical power in hypothesis testing (Preacher et al., 2005).
Moreover, collecting the HR data in 256 Hz frequency should
reduce statistical error and thus increase the effect size.
Participants were given a monetary compensation of 5 EUR
for participation in the study. The study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the local Commission
of Research Ethics, and included obtaining written informed
consent from all subjects. An outlier analysis was carried
out before the hypothesized model was tested. All measures,
manipulations, and exclusions in the study are reported.
Measures and Procedure
The study was carried out in a sound-attenuated room. After
arriving at the lab, participants were asked to complete the Post-
Critical Belief scale again in order to check the stability of the tool
(α = 0.91, M = 3.10; SD = 1.59). Ratings were obtained on a 7-
point scale, from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
Pre- and post-measures were strongly correlated, r(36) = 0.91,
p < 0.001. Then, a baseline measurement of HR was taken for
2 min, during which participants were instructed to sit still and
remain quiet. After that, sixteen stimulating slogans from an
atheist march were displayed for 5,000 ms each on a computer
screen (examples of slogans: Secular Poland – Secular Europe;
Sex Education not Parish Education; Free School – Religion back
to Church). The order of the slogans was randomized for each
participant. Then, all 16 slogans were displayed once again at
the same time and participants were asked to choose which one,
in their opinion, is the most offensive for Catholics. We used
this procedure to involve participants in careful reading of the
slogans and thus strengthen our manipulation. Ninety percent
of participants indicated the sentence, “Every thinking man is an
atheist,” as the most offensive for Catholics.
Further, an experimental HR measurement was taken for
2 min and then participants were randomly assigned to one
of two conditions. Low and high orthodox individuals were
equally distributed to the control and the experimental condition.
In the control group, participants were asked to fill out an
openness questionnaire from the Five Factor Model (Costa and
McCrae, 1992); in the experimental group they filled out the
Negative Attitudes Toward Atheists scale, which was developed
on the base of the measurement by Gervais (2011) (α = 0.93,
M = 4.67, SD = 1.07), and included such items as, “I would be
uncomfortable for me if an atheist taught my child” or “Atheists
are a threat to the social order.” Participants assessed the items
on a 9-point scale, from 1-totally disagree to 9-totally agree.
The completion of the questionnaires in both groups lasted a
comparable period of time.
After completing the questionnaires, the second HR
measurement was taken for 2 min. At the end, participants were
thanked and debriefed. The outline of the study is presented
on Figure 1. All computer tasks were displayed on a 19-inch
LCD monitor. All experimental procedures were programmed in
PsychoPy v. 1.82.01.
Cardiovascular Data Pre-processing and
Apparatus
In the presented study, threat was operationalized as HR level
(Brehm et al., 1964). The electrocardiography (ECG) utilized the
BioSemi ActiveTwo system with one electrode located under the
left collarbone, acquired at a sampling rate of 256 Hz. Harvested
data were off-line filtered using EDFbrowser software. Then,
HR was separated from the ECG signal (Christov, 2004) for
baseline and both first and second experimental measurements.
To calculate HR as a dependent variable, baseline scores were
subtracted from scores derived in each measurement (Llabre
et al., 1991). As a result, we obtained two threat indices: HR1
and HR2 as indicators of threat after the threat manipulation,
i.e., after reading atheistic slogans and after filling out the
questionnaires, respectively.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for HR measurements are presented in
Table 1. First, we examined if the baseline measurements of HR
were reliable, i.e., if there were no differences between group in
HR at the beginning of the experiment. To compare baseline
HR for high and low orthodoxy group, we ran an independent-
samples t-test, which confirmed that there was no significant
difference between groups t(36) = −0.74, p = 0.465, 95% CI
[−15.04, 7.01].
To check the dynamics of HR during the whole study
we calculated HR index: HR2−HR1. Positive value means
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FIGURE 1 | Outline of the study.
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and change from baseline (DV) for HR taken during experiment for low and high orthodox individuals.
Baseline After manipulation After control condition After experimental condition
Orthodoxy level Low High Low High Low High Low High
HR [bpm] 82.59 (15.95) 78.58 (17.50) 80.75 (10.61) 83.51 (21.27) 83.78 (14.54) 79.19 (29.24) 77.26 (10.80) 78.78 (14.09)
HR-baseline [dv] −1.84 (9.22) 4.93 (7.15) −2.94 (5.59) 1.00 (7.18) 1.61 (7.31) −4.01 (4.35)
that there was increase in HR after manipulation, while
negative index means that there was decrease in HR. We
conducted this analysis with this new index as dependent
variable, controlling for baseline level of HR. Main effects
of group (orthodoxy) and condition were insignificant. The
interaction between orthodoxy and condition was significant
F(1,33) = 7.25, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.18. We ran Bonferroni
corrected pairwise comparisons, which showed differences
between experimental and control conditions only for high
orthodox participants, F(1,33) = 11.48, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.26.
In experimental condition the decrease in HR for high orthodox
participants was significantly greater than in control condition
(M = −7.71 bpm; SD = 4.35; M = −0.34 bpm; SD = 7.18,
respectively). For low orthodox participants there were no
difference between the conditions F(1,33) = 0.37, p = 0.545,
η2p = 0.01.
Although the above analysis allowed to studying the dynamic
of HR in both, high and low orthodox groups, they are also
problematic. It is because during HR1 measurement participants
were not yet assigned to any of the conditions. Thus, to make
the picture clear we decided to treat HR2 as a dependent
measure with controlling HR1 since we are interested mainly
in interaction between orthodoxy and the conditions. We
checked if there was a difference in HR after the threat
manipulation, i.e., facing atheistic slogans, between the high
and low orthodox groups. An independent-samples t-test was
conducted to compare HR1 for high and low orthodoxy group.
According to our assumptions, participants high in orthodoxy
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FIGURE 2 | Threat measured by HR as a function of levels of religious
orthodoxy and condition (experimental vs. control). HR2 was calculated by
subtracting the baseline HR measurement from the second HR measurement.
obtained significantly higher levels of HR (M = 4.93 bpm;
SD = 7.15) than those low in orthodoxy (M = −1.84 bpm;
SD= 9.22); t(36)= 2.48, p= 0.018, 95% CI [1.24, 12.30].
In the next step, we checked if participants high and low in
orthodoxy differed on HR levels across conditions (experimental
vs. control). Thus, we ran an ANOVA with high vs. low orthodox
groups and conditions (experimental vs. control) as between-
subject factors and HR2 as the dependent variable. In order
to take into account input levels of arousal, we controlled for
HR1. The main effect of group was F(1,33) = 0.26, p = 0.617,
η2p = 0.008 and the effect of condition was F(1,33) = 0.02,
p = 0.885, η2p = 0.001. As we predicted, the two-way interaction
turned out to be significant F(1,33)= 9.63, p= 0.004, η2p = 0.226.
For the two-way interaction (Figure 2), Bonferroni corrected
pairwise comparisons showed differences between the
experimental and control conditions for highly orthodox
participants, F(1,33) = 4.71, p = 0.037, η2p = 0.125. Participants
high in orthodoxy had lower and significantly reduced HR in the
experimental condition (M = −4.01 bpm; SD = 4.35), than in
the control condition (M = 1.00 bpm; SD = 7.18). However, for
low orthodoxy participants there was also a difference between
the conditions, but of marginal significance, F(1,33) = 4.08,
p = 0.051, η2p = 0.110. In the experimental condition, they had
higher HR (M = 1.61 bpm; SD = 7.31) than in the control
condition (M =−2.94 bpm; SD= 5.59).
We also tested whether highly orthodox participants indeed
expressed prejudice after the threat manipulation. As we
predicted, highly orthodox participants revealed higher levels of
prejudice against atheists (M = 5.69; SD = 1.84), than those
with low orthodoxy level (M = 2.90; SD = 1.39). Comparisons
between groups were significant, t(17)= 3.75, p= 0.002, 95% CI
[1.22, 4.36].
DISCUSSION
In the present study we observed that people who hold high
(vs. low) levels of orthodox beliefs are more sensitive to the
threat manipulation, i.e., after being exposed to atheistic slogans
participants who were high in orthodox belief, but not those
who were low in orthodox belief, responded with increased HR.
This result provides empirical support for the claim that religion,
especially in its orthodox form, although offering relief from
distress and uncertainty (e.g., Inzlicht and Tullett, 2010), at the
same time makes believers especially sensitive to violations of
those religious beliefs. If orthodox beliefs act as a shield against
uncertainty, any violations of such system are regarded as highly
threatening. This is in line with previous studies suggesting that
religious people respond with increased threat to any group that
promotes alternative values or beliefs systems (see: Rowatt et al.,
2014; Kossowska et al., 2016a).
Moreover, our results suggest that prejudice toward a value-
violating group serves as an efficient strategy for reducing
feelings of threat posed by that group. We observed that highly
orthodox people responded with decreased HR after expressing
prejudice against atheists, but with increased HR when they had
no possibility to behave in a prejudiced way. Thus, expressing
prejudice seems to be a self-regulatory mechanism, as self-
regulation is the process by which a system uses information
about its present state to change that state in the pursuit
of goals (McCullough and Boker, 2007). It seems that when
religious worldviews that are essential for orthodox believers are
compromised by the worldviews of other groups, they have the
tendency to reject these groups and this rejection seems to be an
adaptive strategy that helps to reduce threat. This is an important
finding as previous studies have also claimed that prejudice is a
reaction to threat and that it may play a self-regulatory functions,
without providing the kind of direct empirical support we report
here (e.g., Reyna et al., 2006, 2009; Henry and Reyna, 2007;
Wetherell et al., 2013).
We suggest that expressing prejudice helps to cope with the
threat posed by value-violators, and that the validity of a cultural
worldview and the standards and values associated with that
worldview buffers against threat. Thus, expressing prejudice may
reduce threat because it bolsters one’s cultural worldview (e.g.,
Kesebir and Pyszczynski, 2011). It is also possible that expressing
prejudice against members of a threatening group can buffer
one’s self-esteem against self-threats (e.g., Abrams and Hogg,
1990). However, our study did not allow us to identify the exact
mechanism of threat reduction. In addition, it is worth noticing
that the measure of prejudice toward atheists we used in the study
might be understood not only as expressions of prejudice, but
also s affirmations of one’s worldview. This issue calls for another
study.
Although in this study we were interested in the response
patterns of highly orthodox people, the way that people low in
orthodoxy responded in our procedure is also informative. First,
it is worth noticing that being confronted with atheistic slogans,
low orthodox individuals responded with decreased HR. It seems
that these slogans do not pose a threat to their worldviews
and that they feel comfortable with such content. Second, they
responded with increased HR while completing the prejudice
questionnaire. This result suggests that they felt uncomfortable,
as they were asked to behave in a way that was not elicited
by their religious worldview. People expressing low levels of
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religious orthodoxy are more willing to respect other people’s
choice to be religious or non-religious, and they try to find a
personally meaningful interpretation of their beliefs that can be
either religious or non-religious (e.g., Wulff, 1991).
The question arises, however, whether prejudice is the only
self-regulatory strategy used to reduce the threat posed by value-
violating groups. Studies have demonstrated that people can
reduce threat in many different ways, e.g., by pursuing concrete
goals (e.g., chocolate, gambling for money) or abstract goals
such as ideals, ideologies, and beliefs (for an overview see
Jonas et al., 2014). The most effective strategies, however, are
social strategies, meaning those commitments that are nested
within social contexts, that involve social support in interpersonal
relations, or that rely on social identities in group-related contexts
(Jonas et al., 2014). Therefore, despite rejecting an outgroup,
one may rely on social strategies that promote support for
the ingroup, e.g., by showing increased pro-social attitudes,
such as the donation of money to ingroup charities (Jonas
et al., 2002), collective action intentions (Fritsche et al., 2013),
or promoting ingroup symbols and products (e.g., Germans
favoring German restaurants, cars, talk shows, cities, or money;
Jonas et al., 2005). Prejudice does, however, fit well with
these other lines of research, as it is a way of consolidating
the ingroup by pitting it against an outgroup(s). As we did
not study ingroup attitudes, the question whether ingroup
favoritism is an equally effective strategy to reduce threat remains
open.
We claim that the effect we found is probably not
unique to religion per se, and that it would occur with
any form of ideological commitment. There is some research
showing that in the absence of religious beliefs, secular
beliefs based on science or reason can replace religion as
a source of comfort and meaning (e.g., Wulff, 1991; Arndt
et al., 2002; Proulx, 2009; Farias et al., 2013). Thus, we
would expect that expressing prejudice toward value-violators
is an adaptive strategy for any kind of strong and dogmatic
believers for whom competition surrounding relevant value
promotion is important (Kossowska et al., 2016a). On the
other hand, as highly orthodox people’s dominant motivational
concern is the preservation of safety and security (Inzlicht
and Tullett, 2010), threat-relevant information should be
seen as especially informative and valuable. In addition,
they may overestimate the threat. Thus, they may react to
generalized threat by defending their attitudes, values, and
worldviews with intolerance toward people with differing beliefs,
biased processing of attitude-inconsistent information, and the
affirmation of core values. This issue also calls for further
research.
Finally, we would like to highlight some limitations of
our study. First, we presented only one study; a study that
was conducted on a relatively small, preselected, and very
homogeneous sample composed only of Catholics. Hence, the
generalizability of our results is still an open question and
requires further research. Likewise, in the present research we
focused on broad categories of religiosity, such as religious
orthodoxy, and as the outgroup we used only atheists. Therefore,
in future research various finer-grained aspects of religious beliefs
can be explored, as well as different outgroups. Finally, it is
worth noting that although HR is a reliable index of threat
(Brehm et al., 1964), some have argued HR to be an index of
non-specific arousal (Azarbarzin et al., 2014). However, due to
the biological reasons for tachycardia (the HR increasing in the
resting state) we believe that HR is mostly linked to threat, anxiety
and stress. The large body of medical and biological research
supports this assumption (for example: Brodsky et al., 1987;
Tornatzky and Miczek, 1994). However, in follow-up studies it
would nevertheless be useful to include additional measures of
threat apart from the HR index. This would allow for the further
study of how the expression of prejudice may indeed reduce the
perception of threat from value-violating outgroups.
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